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THE PROBLEM AND THE APPROACH
Recent years have seen an increasing use of
multi-year budgets and planning documents for all levels
of organizations. The increasing complexity of enterprises
and the economic constriction has sharpened the focus on
present decisions in terms of their future effects.
Government and service organizations differ from
manufacturing concerns in that a clear and definitive flow
of quantitative results is often obscure and invisible.
The outputs of government and service programs are
difficult to quantify and virtually uncomparable . With
the Federal budget, taxes and national debt cresting to
new highs j adequate planning was ho longer merely desirable
but mandatory in Federal agencies.
In 1961 the Department of Defense introduced a
Planning, Programming, Budgeting (PPB) System. Impressed
by the results of PPB in the Defense Department, President
Johnson in 1965 directed that all Federal agencies adopt




Under the present governmental budgeting
procedures, program review for decision making has
frequently been concentrated within too short a
period; objectives of agency programs have too
often not been specified with enough clarity and
concreteness ; accomplishments have not always
been specified concretely; alternatives have been
insufficiently presented for consideration by top
management; in a number of cases the future year-
costs of present decisions have not been Had out
systematically enough; and formalized planning and
systems analysis have had too little effect on
budget decisions.
The United States Coast Guard, then an agency of
the Treasury Department, came within the scope of the new
executive directive. The thrust of PPB was to put programs
in a systems framework so that analysis and comparisons
could be made among the contributing elements. The Search
and Rescue mission of the Coast Guard, in a systems concept, '(
is composed of aviation units, vessels and shore facilities.
The shore facilities of the Coast Guard, historically, have
been treated as a separate element in the formulation of plans.
The boats and men associated with. the shore facilities have
provided services in support of the various mission tasks
levied by lav; and executive order.
This research study is focused on the shore unit
planning activity of the United States Coast Guard. The
evolution of the planning techniques used to develop shore
station resource requirements will be traced. An assessment
of the probable changes needed to adapt the present
procedures to the changing requirements will be set forth.
1U.S. Executive Office of the President, Bureau of
the Budget, Bulletin No. 66-3, Planning-Programming-Budgeting
(October 12, I965) , P- 1-

The Research Question
The primary research question of this thesis is:
Will the planning techniques presently used by the Unit-
States Coast Guard be satisfactory for developing future
shore station programs? In attempting to formulate an
answer to this question, four subsidiary questions are
posed. The first question concerns the present situation:
What has been the evolution of the present techniques?
The next question points to the adequacy of past planning:
Have the past shore stations' plans been flexible, in view
of changing appropriation levels of Congress, so that plans
could be adjusted to show completion at a lower than desired'
rate rather than necessitating the rewriting of the entire
plan. From these two questions an understanding of the
present system will be gained.
The latter two questions deal with the future
that must be considered. The first deals with externally
generated change: What additional requirements have been
placed upon the planning system of the Coast Guard? The
last question provides a forecast of future changes: What
changes and modifications to present techniques are suggested
to adapt to the dynamics of national priorities?
From the answers to the four subsidiary questions,
the answer to the primary research question will be formed.

Scope
The Search and Rescue Program represents about 25
percent or $112,000,000 of the total operating expense
budget of the United States Coast Guard. The operating
expenses of the Search and Rescue Program can be further
broken down by the major facilities that perform the task
of Search and Rescue— shore units, aviation units, and
vessels. The shore unit portion of the total program
operating expense is about hO percent or $44,000,000.
The responsibility for planning for all operational
activities of the Coast Guard is vested in the Office of
Operations. Responsibility for shore unit planning has
been delegated to the Plans and Programs Section, Surface
Facilities Branch of the Search and Rescue Division.
Planning review takes place at many levels of
staff organization, primarily in the Programs Staff of the
Office of Operations and the Program Review Staff of the
Chief of Staff's Programs Division. Thus, resulting
programs are not singularly generated but rather represent
a composit of many staff level modifications.
Shore station resources are used by the Coast
Guard to perform tasks within several mission areas. The
total requirement for resources must be predicated on the
demands of the several mission areas. The percentage of

5the Coast Guard Budget directly associated with shore
station programs has not significantly changed from year
to year. The total shore station plant of the Coast Guard
represents a capital ire istment of nearly $900 million
dollar,".. Funds for Acquisition, Construction and
Improvement (AC&I) to this capital "investment have
averaged $2.5 million per year over the last five years.
With 16 percent of the shore plant 52 years or older, the
annual amount budgeted for improvements is critical.
This study addresses a small segment of Coast
Guard planning-— shore station planning. The magnitude of
the investment represented by the shore stations, coupled
with minimal AC&I funds and in light of the increasing age
of the stations, presents a critical planning situation if
efficient and effective operations are to continue.
Organization of the Study
The structure of this thesis generally follows
the standard pattern for studies of this nature. The
second chapter provides a brief history of the United
States Coast Guard. The present organizational structure
is shown. The roles and missions of the service are set
out. This chapter provides the necessary background for a
more complete understanding of the planning that appears
in subsequent chapters.

6Chapter III describes the evolution of shore
station planning from the early days to the present. The
success of the various planning activities will be related.
In the forth chapter the requirements for
planning, programming, and budgeting will be reviewed.
The capabilities of the current system will be evaluated
in terms of the changing requirements of the Search and
Rescue Program and the Coast Guard in general.
Finally 5 the concluding chapter contains the
research findings, conclusions of the thesis and recommendations




The history of the United States Coast Guard
goes back more than a century and three quarters to the
founding years of the United States. This Nation dates
from the signing of the Declaration of Independence on
July 4, 1776. A constitutional form of government did not
begin until 1789. On August 4, 1700, President George
Washington signed into lav/ an act authorizing the
construction of ten boats for guarding the coasts against
2
smugglers. The Congress had passed shipping tariffs as
a means of raising funds to support the activities of the
Federal government and to pay the national debt.
Alexander Hamilton, as Secretary of the Treasury,
was faced with the task of collecting revenues to support
the Federal government. The established customs offices
ashore were ineffective in collecting the shipping tariffs
and, thus, the Revenue Cutter Service became the seagoing
enforcement arm of the Federal government. The task of
"The material in this section is drawn from many
sources such that detailed footnoting would unnecessarily
burden the reader's. For a definitive history of the Coast
Guard see: Stephen N. Evans, The United ' • Coast Guard
1770-1915 (Annapolis, Maryland: Th< United States Naval
Institute, 19^9).
2 Act of August 4, 1790 ('1 Stat. L., 145, 175).

8enforcing compliance with the customs law was to prove
challenging to the newly formed service, for in the years
of struggling for independence and refuge from taxation,
smuggling had become an accepted way of life that was
not to be readily changed.
The Congress in 1799 directed that the "Revenue
Cutters shall, whenever the President of the United States
shall so direct, cooperate with the Navy of the United
States."" This legislative foundation provided for a
cooperative situation that exists until the present day;
that the Coast Guard functions in a civil executive
department under normal circumstances but is shifted to a
military department in time of war or at such other times
as the President directs.
In 1789 the Revenue Cutters conducted extensive
action against the French privateers when directed by
President John Adams to assist the Navy. It wasn't until
the V/ar of 1812 that the Revenue Cutters were called upon
again to assist the Navy. At the conclusion of that
conflict in 1815 the cutters. turned their attention toward
pirates and slave ships. In the next few years, more than
five hundred slaves were liberated by the cutters enforcing
the law forbidding their importation.
In 1832 South Carolina acted to "negate and
nullify" the Federal tariff on imports. Five cutters were
1a,Act of March 2, 1799 (1 Stat. L., 627, 699)

9dispatched by President Andrew Jackson to enforce the law.
The cutters impounded the cargo of ships entering the
Charleston harbor. A crises developed that was only to
be rectified by Henry Clay's Tariff Compromise of 1833.
In I836 the Revenue Cutters sav; action against
the Seminole Indians in Florida. While engaged in these
operations the Cutter WASHINGTON is credited with
conducting the first amphibious landing of combined forces
by the United States. This action precluded by more than
a century similar operations by United States and allied
forces in World War II.
In April 1861, the Cutter HARRIET LANE fired the
shot generally conceded the first of the Civil War, when she
fired on the steamer NASHVILLE. The NASHVILLE was attempting
to slip into Charleston harbor without proper display of
her colors. The cutters served with the Navy in the blockade
of southern ports which prevented European supplies from
reaching the Confederate forces.
At the conclusion of the Civil War, the Revenue
Cutters were returned to Treasury control and enjoyed a long
period of cairn until the Spanish-American War in 1898.
Eighteen cutters saw action in that war.
The history of the Coast Guard spread to the
distant shores of Alaska immediately after the ratifj Lon
of the Treaty of Purchase in 1867. Lieutenant Georg
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Moore, U.S. R-M. was the United States government's first
special representative to the new territory.
Subsequent years saw the Revenue Cutters
establishing contact with the remote fishing villages
and providing medical care to the natives. This aid was
to continue for many years in the form of annual summer
cruises in the Alaskan waters.
These summer cruises also carried judical officers
to dispense justice. Court was frequently held aboard the
cutters with officers serving as Deputy United States
Marshalls or other appointed court officials.
Additional law enforcement duties were undertaken
in the protection of fur seals which were faced with
extinction from pelagic sealing. The cutters by their
efforts were able to curtail this practice of killing seals
as they slept floating on the water surface. Pur seals are
today a flourishing resource.
The Revenue Cutter personnel, cooperating with
the Bureau of Education and the Fish Commission, transported
from Siberia the first domestic reindeer. Reindeer herds
continue to be of great economic importance to the Eskimos.
Summer cruises continued until the 1960's when permanent
airfields were constructed and radio communications made
the native villages a part of the outside world.
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The sinking of the TITANIC on her maiden voyage
in 19-12 shocked the entire world. In the fall of 1913,
an international conference drew up a treaty that would
provide for derelict destruction, ice patrol services and
observation. The United States was invited to assume the
management and operation of this service. It was agreed
that the cost of this patrol would be shared by the maritime
users of the service. The ice patrol duties were undertaken
by the Revenue Cutter Service at the direction of the
President in 1913 and have continued to the present day.
In 1915 the Revenue Cutter Service and the
Lifesaving Service were merged and the Coast Guard was
formed. To the Lifesaving Services, the Coast Guard owes
the greatest portion of its traditions with respect to
Search and Re s c u e a c b i cities.
The words "Plan 1 Acknowledge" once again signaled
the transfer of Coast Guard units to the Navy. On the
morning of April 6, 1917 the United States went to war
against Germany and fifteen cruising cutters manned by
more than 5,200 of] rs and -men were placed under Navy
control. Naval 'on of this period was almost exclusively
concerned with anti submarine warfare. The Coast Guard
participated in lis effort by convoying cargo ships and




With the signing of the armistice the Coast Guard
once again reverted back to the control of the Treasury
.
In the following years the Coast Guard fell to low esteem
in the eyes of the public, for to the service fell the
burden of enforcing the unpopular eighteenth amendment
and the prohibition of the importation of alcoholic
beverages. Congress gave little support to the Coast Guard's
efforts and so the service was greatly relieved when repeal
came .
In 1939 the Lighthouse Service, which had been a
part of the Commerce Department since 1910, was returned
to the Treasury Department. Rather than returning to its
former bureau status, the service was incorporated into the
Coast Guard.
With the United States entry into the Second World
War in December 19*11, the Coast Guard again became a
functioning part of the Navy. The number of weather
patrol stations were increased, convoys were escorted,
beach patrols were established, troop transports were
manned, and Coast Guardsmen provided the expertise In
operating the landing craft used in the amphibious assaults.
The Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation of
the Commerce Department was temporarily transferred to the
Coast Guard in 19*12 so as to improve wartime management.
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In 19 il6 the transfer became permanent and the Coast Guard
took on the task of inspecting merchant vessel design,
construction and alterations.
The return of peace in 19^5 brought problems of
contraction in the force level. The readjustments to
normal peacetime size was almost complete when expansion
was required to staff and support the program of long range
electronic navigation aids (LORAN) that had begun during
the war and was now expanding. Additional expansion was
required to provide increased search and rescue needed to
protect logistic routes of the Korean War. Additional
weather stations in the Pacific were manned to assist air
and sea traffic.
As in earlier times, the ceasation of hostilities
again dictated a reduction in force. A steady and
conservative expansion to meet the increasing public demand
was the course dictated for the Coast Guard. As the Viet
Nam War intensified the Coast Guard was called upon to
assist. Twenty-six patrol boats answered the call and
were assigned duties patrolling the coast searching for
contraband arms and munitions being shipped into the country
to supply the Viet Cong. As the war grew on, five large
cutters were added to the conflicl The larger cutters
provided needed support for the smaller patrol boats and
also provided an. off-shore barrier patrol that would
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interdict illicit arms shipments further off shore.
Electronic navigation stations were rushed to completion
to provide the most accurate means of navigation to the
Southeast Asia area. Additionally, Coast Guard forces
were called upon to provide expertise in the supervision
of the off loading of explosives and the maintenance of
a navigation system for the rivers and coastal area. To
date, the original twenty-six patrol craft and two of the
cutters have been turned over to the South Vietnamese
Navy. The Coast Guard forces will have a continuing
support function for the time that American forces remain.
Thus, Coast Guard history spans more than one hundred-
eighty years of domestic and foreign service.
THE FIRST SHORE STATIONS
The Life Saving Service began with the
Massachusetts Humane Society. This society was established
in 1785, patterned after the Royal Humane Society of England,
as a volunteer force to assist endangered mariners. Through
the years these guardians of the coasts received much
acclaim for their rescues in the pounding surf.
In 18^9 Congress passed the Lighthouse Act which
provided funds for the construction of several lighthouses
Evan J. David, Our Coast Guard (New York: D.
Appleton-Century Company, 1937 ) , P~^ 29 5 •
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on the Atlantic Coast in an effort to prevent marine
tragedies. fith the passage of this act a systems approach
to maritime safety was begun which provided for preventative
as well as remedial actions.
In 18^8 Congress appropriated funds to provide
surfboatSj rockets, and carronades" -to assist the lifesaving
work of these volunteer surfmen. The equipment purchased
by federal funds was distributed to the surf stations but
'
little if any control was maintained at a central level.
In I87O Congress made a small appropriation to
pay. six experienced surfmen for each of the boats at
alternate life saving stations on the New Jersey Coast from
December 15th to March 15th. The federal government had
realized the importance of having a full-time force ready
to respond to an emergency even in the times of low traffic
and little chance for a distress situation. This action
was to signal the beginning of the end for this respected
volunteer organization.
The Organic Act of 1878 gave to the Life Saving
Service the status of a regular unit of the Treasury
Department and established a Board on Life Saving Appliances.
The threads of improved management and control were being
woven
.
In i860 horses were purchased for hauling the
beach rescue equipment from the stations to the scene of
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the distress. The introduction of the motorboat, telephone
and radio revolutionized the service.
The dynamics of change reached a peak on January
28 j 1915a when the Coast Guard was formed by joining the
Revenue Cutter Service and the Life Saving Service.
Modernization has occurred and the 'transition from the
surfboat to the motorboat has required the relocation of
many of the original stations to a protected position
within the river mouths and inlets.
Duties
The Coast Guard of today is an agency charged
with the performance of tasks in a great variety of
mission areas. These duties may be grouped in the program
areas of Search and Rescue, Aids to Navigation, Law
Enforcement, Military Readiness, Merchant Marine Safety,
and Oceanography and Polar Operations.
The Search and Rescue mission involves the
responsibility of the Coast Guard to render aid and
assistance to persons and property endangered or in
distress on, over or under the high seas and waters of
United States jurisdiction. To provide assistance to
vessels on the high seas, the Coast Guard developed a
computerized position reporting system that allows the
The prominent work defining Coast Guard missions
is: U.S. Treasury Department, A Study of the Roles and
Missions of the United States Coast Guard, 1962. 7 vols.

17
Coast Guard to determine, in the event of a disaster, the
location of any vessel in the area of the reported distress.
The program is joined voluntarily by furnishing the Coast
Guard with sailing information as to port of departure,
destination, speed, trackline and any changes in initial
plans. This information is updated" daily by reports from
the participating vessels.
Also included in this mission area is the service
of keeping domestic harbors and waterways open to commerce.
Domestic icebreakin Is carried out on the Great Lakes and
on the rivers and harbors of the Northeast as well as
Alaska.
The Aids to Navigation mission area covers the
system that provides the necessary position fixing services
for mariners. Buoys, fixed markers , and lighthouses mark
sealanes, harbors and coastal waters. A system of long
range electronic aids vertically blankets the globe
providing services for merchant vessels and military alike.
The Coast Guard acts as a maritime policeman in
the mission area of Lav* Enforcement. The myriad of laws
,
regulations, treatii ;: and agreements are enforced and
monitored by the Coast Guard to promote compliance. The




The Coast Guard is charged with standing ready as
a military force to defend the country
. During peacetime
the Coast Guard trains with and is evaluated by the Navy
so that transfer to the Navy in time of conflict would
be as uneventful as possible.
The mission of Merchant Marine Safety covers
certificating of personnel to man the merchant vessels of
the United States. Inspection is made of all vessels that
are under construction or being refurbished to insure
complete compliance with the regulations. Periodic
inspection of ships and drilling of their crews in proper
emergency procedures help to insure a high level of safety
in the United States merchant fleet.
Recently, additional requirements have been
placed on the Coast Guard to inspect foreign vessels that
operate from our ports a large part of the time. The
purpose of these inspections is to lessen the probability
of recurrence of a disaster such as recently beset several
foreign vessels with a large number of United States
citizens aboard.
Rapid increase in mission workload has occurred
in the field of Oceanography and Po]ar Operations. The
ocean station weather patrols have continued with an
added requirement to obtain oceanographic data as to
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water temperature vs. depth, salinity, water samples,
charting ocean bottom contours and checking the composition
of the ocean floor.
The Coast Guard has taken over the operation of
all United States Icebreakers. Five heavy ocean going
icebreakers formerly operated by the Navy have been
transferred to the Coast Guard. These icebreakers are
operated in accordance with the national program of polar
operations in coordination with the Navy and the National
Science Foundation.
While no means all inclusive as to total
responsibilities, the foregoing indicates the broad range
of Coast Guard interest and involvement. In the broadest
sense of the word, the Coast Guard reaches to every corner
of the globe with men stationed from Thailand and Viet Nam
to Turkey and Iran with vessels and aircraft ranging from
Arctic to Antarctic.
Organization
In order to quickly, adjust to being transferred
from department to department, the Coast Guard is structured
so as to fit neatly into the organization of the U.S. Navy
1 upon.
e Coast Guard has been organized into two Areas
and Twelve districts. For obvious reasons these district
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boundaries coincide closely with those of the Navy (See
Figure 1). Within several districts there are units that
report directly to the Commandant and these units are
designated as Headquarters Units.
The two Area Commanders are charged with
coordinating incidents and activities that affect more
than one district. The Area Commanders are charged with
carrying out the Ocean Station program. Area Commanders
have no forces assigned and must coordinate forces within
several districts.
Within the Department of Transportation, the
Coast Guard is one of six independent agencies (See Figure
2). The Commandant of the Coast Guard reports directly
to the Secretary as do the heads of the other five agencies.
The chain of line command extends from the
Commandant to the District Commanders and then to the
individual Unit Commanders. The various offices at the
Headquarters level serve as staff to the Commandant through
the Chief of Staff (See Figure 3)- Each office is made up
of several divisions which in turn are subdivided into
branches and sections.
While its operations are decentralized, the
functions of planning in the Coast Guard are centralized
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Prior to World War II 3 the Coast Guard had no
central staff charged with the performance of long range
planning. Each major organizational unit at Headquarters
concerned itself in certain phases of these functions on
an individual basis in a manner that seriously inhibited
adequate coordination of common endeavor and that encouraged
duplication and lost motion. A small Permanent Boards to a
limited extent 3 assisted the Commandant in the study of
major problems and the development of basic plans and
programs. The Assistant Commandant functioned as Chief
Operations Officer of the service and exercise central
operational control of the Coast Guard forces. The
Commandant himself, with the assistance of the assistant
Commandant engaged directly in planning, operating and
controlling activities of the service.
The period following World War II until the early
1960's was characterized by a growth in the planning staffs
within Coast Guard Headquarters with the formal planning




the Office of Operations was organized in a facility
orientation rather than a strictly functional arrangement.
The operational planning for Search and Rescue
(SAR) facilities in a specific geographic area usually
originate with the District Commander. District proposals
for SAR., as for other aspects of operation, are usually
first submitted to Headquarters in the form of an operations
planning proposal. The operations planning program is
coordinated by the Office of Operations
.
Another primary planning activity which must be
considered is provided by special boards convened to
examine aviation facilities, floating units, and shore
units. These special boards examine overall Coast Guard
needs, and in doing so they have used proposals already
submitted to call for special information. The reports of
these boards provide a long range, integrated program for
replacement of obsolete equipment, establishment of needed
facilities and regrouping of present facilities.
The impetus to conduct the aviation requirements
study of 1957 came from a source external to the Coast
Guard organization. During an appropriation hearing before
a Congressional Committee, a question arose as to the long-
range plans for replacement and use of aircraft. The
Coast Guard was not able to provide a satisfactory answer
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and was told in so many words to come back when it could.
This set in motion a study which produced what was known as
the Aviation Plan. Plans for vessels and shore units soon
followed.
The early efforts in long range planning resulted
in the promulgation of three separate facility plans. The
aviation requirements report was completed and approved
in 1957 , and later re-evaluated and reapproved in 1961.
The vessel requirements report was completed in November,
1959. The shore unit report was completed in 1962. Each
of these facility oriented plans indicated that very large
appropriations would be required to bring about the
modernization that was expressed in each.
When the U.S. Treasury Department began to see
the magnitude of the cost required to modernize the Coast
Guard facilities, it was decided a major realignment of
Coast Guard operations was necessary to provide an adequate
framework for long range planning.
2
Roles and Missions Study
A comprehensive study of Coast Guard roles and
missions was completed during 1961-62 by an inter-agency
group composed of representatives from the Bureau of the
Walter C. Cap ron, The United States Coast Guard
,
(New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., l965)j p. 200.
2
U.S. Treasury Department, Study of the Roles and
Missions of the United States Coa s t- Guard
,
Report to the
Secretary, June 1962 (7 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1963), I 5 p. C-28. [Cited hereafter as





Budget j Department of Defense, and the Treasury Department.
The Roles and Missions Study was undertaken at the request
of Secretary of the Treasury, Douglas Dillion, with the
objective of clarifying the duties and responsibilities of
the Coast Guard so as to provide a sound basis for long
range planning. The Roles and Missions Study grouped Coast
Guard duties and responsibilities into ten mission-oriented
categories: Search and Rescue ^ Aids to Navigation, Merchant
Marine Safety, Reserve Training, Ice Breaking, Oceanography,
Military Readiness, Port Security, Ocean Stations, and Law
Enforcement
.
The Roles and Missions study has had far-reaching
effects. An early, direct outgrowth of the study was the
1
development of United States Coast Guard Objectives . The
purpose of Coast Guard Objectives was stated in the forward.
"The objectives contained herein are a first step toward a
long range planning structure responsive to those
requirements
.
The objectives were based on four basic assumptions
The first was the assumption .that the broad base growth of
the United States, with a corresponding increase in Coast
Guard workload, would continue. The second assumption was
that fiscal resources would permit modernization of
existing st Guard facilities and provide sufficient funds
U.S. Treasury Department, Coast Guard, United States
Coast Gu ard Objectives (CG-378), 196*1.
2
Ibid., p. i. (Requirements meaning statutory
missions, clear" policy and operational guidelines).
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to carry out the expanded workload and responsibilities.
A third assumption was that the Cold War would continue on
all levels short of unlimited war. The fourth and final
assumption was that international cooperation among the free
and uncommitted nations of the world would increase in
1importance."
The development of plans and programs to meet
mission objectives has been guided by the Roles and Mission
Study and Coast Guard Objectives.
Shore Units Plan
The Coast Guard shore plant is scattered
over nearly three-quarters of the globe. Coast
Guard manned and maintained sites extend east and
west from the South China Sea to the Straits of
Bosporus and from the Arctic Circle to the
Equator. Excluding 23*000 buoys, fixed Coast
Guard structures exist in 18,300 different
geographic locations and consist of 880
manned units and 18,000 unmanned installations.
Of the 880 manned units, 670 represent significant
monetary investments in both construction and
maintenance costs. Due to variance in operational
demands and geographical conditions, there are
major differences in nearly all structures.
Thus, the general overview to the shore unit
situation is set forth in the Shore Units Plan . The Coast
Guard plant has evolved over many years from the agencies
which comprise the present day Coast Guard. Structures
1Ibid. pp. 6-7.
2
U.S. Treasury Department, Coast Guard, Shore Units
Plan, (CG-380), 1962, p. II-l.
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still are in operational use which were built for the
Life Saving Service and others which were placed under
Coast Guard jurisdiction when the Coast Guard and Lighthouse
Service amalgmation took place.' Experience with maintenance






2. Exposure to the elements
3. Obsolescence
!
\ . Rising costs
5. Limited plant replacement funds
Age
Sixteen percent of all shore stations are currently
50 years old and another 16 percent are over 30 years old.
Implementation of the Shore Units Plan will not appreciably
2
alter the upward trend of aging. It is known that while
age and costs Increase together their rates are
disproportionate
.
Exposure to the Elements
Most fixed structures are located In exposed
locations subject to severe ravages of nature. Erosion of
the shoreline has, in some areas, changed navigable channels
and harbor entrances necessitating structural changes and
rebuilding or relocating of facilities.
"Lieutenant Commander C.S. Mincks , USCG, Chief
Programs Section, Surface Facilities Branch, Search and Rescue
Division, V/ashington, D.C., February, 1971.







particularly in the aids
to navigation field, have made constant changes necessary
in audio, visual and electronic ' equipment installations.
Wherever it is economically sound, manned units have been
and will be converted to unmanned Units provided the
required level of performance can be furnished.
Rising Costs
This item is always of concern and it is common
knowledge that the period of i960 to 1970 was a period of
rapidly increasing costs for labor, materials, and
construction. A fixed celling type budget for maintenance
is not compatible with these increases.
Limited Plant Replacement Funds
Replacement funds are obtainable from two sources:
1. A small amount from the Operating Expense
Appropriations if the project is under
$50,000.
2, The major part from the Acquisition,
Construction and Improvement Appropriation
(AC&I)
.
The planned program of replacement to overcome
obsolescence is based en a 50-year service life or 2
percent replacement per year. "At the present time the
replacement value of the shore establishment is approximately
$650 million and therefore 413 million will be required
annually. t! The present value of the shore p]ant is




estimated at $900 million and would Indicate that about
$20 million should be spent annually for replacement. The
amount of AC&I funds spent for improvements, rehabilitation,
or new construction for Search and Rescue shore stations
since 196? are shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
SAR PROGRAM AC&I FUNDING
(Amounts in Thousands of Dollars)
Fisca] Year Total SAR Air Stations Vessels Shore Units
1967 29,807 26,600 - 3,207
K
1968 37,577 26,950 2,956 7,671
1969 15,870 11,500 - 4,370
1970 16,020 11,900 - 1,120
1971 14,915 13,080 • 180 1,355
1972 s 35,600 30,100 - 5,500
1973** 30,310 21,410 - 8,800




> Data for 1972 derived from Congressional
Stage Budget.




The annual appropriations for shore station AC&I
funds have not reached the desired level of $13 million
that is calculated to maintain the operational level of
the present shore plant.
The decision making process concerning capital
investments is admittedly most difficult. The difficulty
of this type of decision making is characterized by Joel
Dean as follows
:
Making decisions on capital expenditures
is one of the most demanding responsibilities
of top management. There are few guideposts
for determining either the amount or kind of
investment to make. Without such guides,
decisions are made on the basis of ill-defined
standards and intuitive judgment. There is a
need for an analytical framework that will
systematize management's approach to this
problem. -1-
The problem of developing guides for capital
expenditures within the Coast Guard is clouded and
distorted by the multi-mission nature of most facilities.
Multi-mission stations are proposed and funded by the
primary mission sponsor. Likewise the operating expenses
of these multi-mission stations are charged to the major
mission program. Search and Rescue is the major program
2
Joel Dean, Capital Budgeting , (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1951, preface.
2
Lieutenant Commander J. 0. Sullivan, USCG,
Budget Coordinator, Search and Rescue Division, personal
interview at Coast Guard Headquarters, April 25, 1971.
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in the Coast Guard, consuming in excess of 25 percent of
1
all operating funds. If the operating costs for these
multi-mission stations were structly allocated to all
programs (Search and Rescue, Aids to Navigation, Port
Security, Boating Safety, etc.) the overall cost of the
Search and Rescue program would be reduced. Most Coast
Guard field units, such as ships, air stations, and bases,
are multi-functional and are costed to programs through a
computer-assisted blend of cost reports and operational
statistics
.
The problem that the shore units face is one of
competition for the allocation of scarce resources.
Competition comes from within the Search and Rescue
program and from all other programs. Within the SAR
program comparison between buying shore stations or aircraft
or vessels is possible because each produce benefits, in
terms of the SAR program, that are quantifiable. Difficulty
arises when the decision must be made between dissimilar
projects, i.e. search and rescue and aids to navigation,
with benefit measures that are not comparable. At this
point the analytical framework breaks down, and judgment
must weigh the merits and produce a decision.
Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean point out





resources can be promoted through a better understanding
of the nature of the problem, the systematic quantitative
analysis of alternatives, and improving the environment
or framework within which resource allocation decisions
1
are made. A greater understanding of the allocation
problem is gained through analytical study.
Operational Expenditure Planning
The Coast Guard and other government agencies
have tranditionally used the requirements or priorities
approach to resource allocation. Under the requirements
approach, requirements are derived from a feasible plan,
in terms of resources and desired characteristics, which
appear to solve the problem. Frequently, requirements are
based on need alone with little attention given to relative
costs of different resources. Under the priorities approach,
desirable items are ranked according to degree of need.
The efficient allocation of resources is seldom achieved
2
under either method. The three facility plans, aircraft,
vessels, and shore units, had been conceived in near
isolation of each other— a condition which does not permit
the efficient allocation of resources to meet an objective.
1
Charles J. Hitch and Roland M. HcKean, The
Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press^ 196] ) , p . 107
•
2
Morris D. Helton, "The Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System as a Coast Guard Management Tool,"
(Unpublished MBA Thesis, School of Government and Business




Former President Eisenhower expressed the interface between
competing programs as follows
:
The cost of one modern bomber is this
:
a modern brick school in more than 30.
cities.
. .two electric power plants, each
serving a town of 60,000 population. . .
two fine, fully equipped hospitals. . .
some 30 miles of concrete highway.-1
The previous statement indicates the comparability of
program costs but does not approach the hidden portion of
the iceberg, the matter of relative priorities of program
benefits and objectives. The matter of priorities of
competing programs is most difficult to quantify and treat
analytically; and it will not be dealt with in this paper.
This section will deal with the analytic study that has
had a direct impact on the shore units and specifically,
shore station planning.
In 1962 the Roles and Mission Study recognized
the nature and degree of the problem confronting Coast
Guard planners when it stated:
The problem is basic : How can one
correlate the tremendous number of variations
in a manner that will permit an orderly, and
reasonably scientific, process of decision
making? The variables are almost limitless;
some of the more significant variables are:
type of vess ] or aircraft in distress, the
number of peopl* involved, the location of
incidents- the distance to be covered by
Coast Gua] Lsting resource, the number
and type oJ ; Lsting resources required,
Dwi ;ht D. Eisenhower, "The Change for Peace,"
an address reprinted in The Department of State Bulletin
April 27, 1953, ' 600.
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the number arid frequency of incidents now
and future, other mission requirements, and
the availability of resources to supplement
those of the Coast Guard. Some of these
variables may be taken into consideration
using traditional methods of experience and
judgment to establish numbers and location
requirements. Placement of all of these in




The Roles and Mission Study had realized the need for, and
recommended the use of modern operational analysis techniques
2
in 1962.
The year 1967 was a year of change for the Coast
Guard for in April its long relationship with the Treasury
Department ended and its association with the Department
of Transportation began. The Commandant ordered an
"Administrative General Quarters" to speed the process of
realignment under the new department and to identify problem
areas within existing programs that required clarification.
It was at this time that the Aviation Issue Study (a
significant revision of the Aviation Plan) was submitted to
the Commandant. The Aviation Issue Study constructed, to a
greater extent than ever before, a firm quantitative
foundation beneath the planning for aviation resources and
3
provided several innovations from previous plans. The
very process of answering questions inevitably creates more
questions also pertinent to the general problem, and so it





%.S. Department of Transportation, Coast Guard,
SAR Criteria and Force Analysis , 1st interim report, June
l^TTb7", p. 1 [Hereafter designated as SAR Study ] .
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was with the Aviation Issue Study. The Commandant




(1) development of search and rescue effectiveness
criteria which are applicable to all means of effecting
rescue ,'
(2) refinement of the forecasting techniques to
determine future levels of search and rescue flight hours,
(3) analysis of alternative manning and readiness
policies
,
(4) analysis of alternative maintenance policies,
(5) analysis on an integrated basis (cutter, shore
stations, and aircraft) of alternative search and rescue
forces
.
As an initial step to conducting the required
studies it was necessary to select an approach to the problems
Before proceeding with such an approach the thought occurred
that perhaps the questions raised were not the real problems
2
but only symptoms of the real problem. It was reasoned that
if item 5 above could be appropriately structured, then it
would meet the needs of all five studies and would also:
(1) serve to reorient Coast Guard SAR planning to an output




Captain N. P. Ensrud, Chief, Plans Staff, Office of
Operations, personal interview, April 13, 1971.
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previous SAR studies. Thus, the SAR Criteria and Force
Analysis was born.




To define search and. rescue and the range of
potential Coast Guard involvement therein and
To identify the advantages, disadvantages and
ramifications of alternative Coast Guard roles
so that top management can make informed
decisions on future activities. .
Having set down a purpose, the desired end product
was conceptualized as "a dynamic, integrated, analytical
decision-making process for allocation of resources and
3
deployment of SAR forces and. facilities."
The ambiguity of modern management terms requires
an explanation of terms. Dynamic was intended to convey
an ability to reflect change with the passage of time, capable
of staying abreast of change.
Integrated was meant to Indicate a whole entity
comprised of components each viewed in the framework of
the whole. Particularly the interaction of various resources
to accomplish the overall mission requirements as opposed to
a fragmented viewpoint.
Analytical was intended to denote a breakdown
into components and. subsequent examination to determine
Ensrud. , Interview .





relationships in the complex overall problem. Analysis
implies quantification where such is possible, but as
important recognizes the necessity of identification of
non-quantifiable items.
A decision-making process intended to assist the
decision-maker in understanding the effects of his decisions
and thus arriving at a better course of action. This
process is intended as an aid not a substitute.
The study was structured so as to be flexible,
allowing for adoption to change without need for major
restructuring. With these thoughts in mind the structuring
is shown in Figure 4. This structure of the study was
present 1 d to and accepted by top management which subsequently
lead to the study being designated a Major Program Issue
(MPI) for FY- 70.
The initial work of structuring the SAR Criteria
and Force Analysis was accomplished by several persons
assigned to Headquarters who had previously been engaged in
analytical study efforts. The study team was increased by
the addition of several officers with recent experience in
2
the operational aspects of search and rescue. The blend
of analytical and operational expertise that evolved on the
U.S. Congres
a
Joint Economic Committee, The
Analysis and Eva luation of Public Expenditures: The PPB
System
,
A Compendium of Papers submitted to the Subcommittee
on Economy in Government s 91st Congress, 1st. sers.,
(Washington 3 D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1969), Vol.
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4]
study staff is considered by Victor Lazzaro to be the ideal
... <. 1composition for a systems study.
Having developed a structure, the procedure was
to analyze each element identifying all variables where
possible and specifying interfaces between the various
elements. Periodic discussions with top management insured
the steady course of the study efforts and provided guidance
as to the scope of the first two elements.
The definition of SAR was accepted as the
definition in the National Search and Rescue Manual. The
range of Coast Guard involvement or responsibility was
limited j for study purposes , to the present statutory
authority of the Coast Guard as specified in Title 14 of
2
the United States Code. The period from November 1 Q 6
7
until August 1968, was one of formalizing the structure of
the study by means of interactive discussions with top
management
.
The work of defining the .study structure did
little if anything to limit the scope of the problem. It
was apparent that addressing' the entire problem as a unit
was not feasible. As with most large analytical efforts
it became necessary to modularize the study. Individual
modules would be designed to interface with each other.
"Victor Lazzaro, ed . , Systems and Procedures : A
Handbook for Business and Industry, (Englewood Cliffs, New-
Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1968), 2nd ed., p. 31.
2
SAR Study, 1st Interim Report, p. 8.
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The initial module selected was the shore unit
with its boats. The selection was based on consideration
of relative independence of activity, homogeneity of
resources, percentage of the total problem and level of
true decision making.
It was determined that queuing theory was
appropriate to describe the server-client relationship in
the SAR program. The use of a queuing, model utilizes the
arrival rate of clients coming into the SAR system and the
service time required to complete the required assistance.
So that the queuing model functions properly, the arrival
rate of assistance cases must conform to a Poisson
distribution and the service times must be described by a
negative exponential distribution.
Data to develop the distributions for arrivals
and service was available in the master file of Assistance
Reports that is maintained at Coast Guard Headquarters.
From the SAR data on file, it was determined that the
arrivals did conform to a Poisson distribution at a 95
percent confidence level: and. that the service time
distribution could be satisfactorily described by a
2
negative exponential distribution. The arrival and service
SAR Study, 2nd interim report, p. ix.
2
SAR Study, 2nd interim report, p. 8. (The negative
exponential was a conservative fit to the actual data and it
was realized that a better fit could be possible with an
Erlang distribution. For this initial run through the model
the conservative approach was chosen.)
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time distributions were developed on a station-by-station
basis so as to describe the workload at a particular shore
station
.
Attention was then directed to the resources,
small boats, personnel, etc., that might be available at
shore units through 1980, the time "frame for the initial
analysis
.
A detailed analysis of the resources presently
available or that appeared likely to be developed concluded
that while several new innovative watercraft looked
promising for the future, none were likely to be
operationally effective until at least the latter part of
the 1970's.
The procedures for the use of small boats offered
little room for reducing service times. Speed of the boat
is a factor in limiting the time to arrive on scene, but
since most cases involved towing at rather slow speeds,
which is dictated by the hull strength of the pleasure
craft, increased speed would only slightly shorten total
case duration.
The personnel policies that applied to shore
units were reviewed. From this analysis a new manpower
utilization standard was developed that "sought to strike




levels, esprit de corps and the general competitive
situation for human resources." The original
recommendation of the study group was for a work week
standard of 52 hours: however , after review by the
Commandant the standard was set at 68 hours for planning
2
purposes. The adoption of a new workweek standard for shore
units was considered a major break through in shore unit
3planning. Many shore stations had in the past operated
with workweeks in the range of 120 hours especially during
the heavy peak season. For the period of the second
interim report the greatest efforts of the study team
were focused on the development of a model that would
V
measure the effectiveness of various levels of forces at
shore stations.
The basic philosophy that had determined past
SAR force levels was that a human life was so precious
that almost any expense was justified if it could be
expected to save a life. Thus, rescue stations were ready
to launch all boats attached at all hours of the day or
night because a demand might arise for them and a delay






Commander C. Robbins, USCG, Administrative
Assistant, Search and Rescue Division, personal interview,
April 23, 1971.
SAR Study, 2nd interim report, p. 1*1.
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Despite the rapid response of Coast Guard units
to each case as it arose, there were approximately ]^00
lives lost annually on the waters in question. The SAR
system saves about 2350 lives a year and calculations
indicated prevention of the deaths of about 2100 additional
persons annually.
The effectiveness of the SAR system could be
expressed as the number of lives saved and deaths prevented
divided by the sum of lives saved (LS) plus lives lost (LL)
plus deaths prevented (DP). For 196? this gave an
effectiveness of 76%.
LS + DP 235^ + 2078
= 7fi
-
LS + DP + LL 2357T+ 2078 + 139^ ' /o
An obvious decision would be to increase the
number of resources to save additional lives and thus
improve system efficiency. The presumption being that the
lives lost were capable of being saved by a reactive force,
namely the Coast Guard.
There existed a file of investigative reports
that probed into each incident that led to a fatality.
These reports were reviewed to establish the validity of
the presumption. The review concluded that in fact few,
if any, of the lives lost could have been saved by any
2







of this review was to show that the existing effectiveness .
was near 100$.
The hypotheses that reducing the time to reach
the scene of an incident would yield significant increase
in the number of persons rescued was placed in question.
It was hypothesized that further delay in response could
be accepted with only a slight increase In the probability
of experiencing additional deaths. If this hypothesis could
be accepted the general workload could be segregated into
two distinct classes 3 serious and non-serious.
The fact that the majority of distress incidents
were reported directly to the Coast Guard by the distressed
craft via radio telephone greatly enabled the shore unit
personnel to accurately evaluate the situtation as to
serious or non-serious at the time of notification. With
two distinct types of cases the model could be programmed
with a set of operational rules that approximated the real
world situation. In fact, the station personnel indicated
that from information given to them by a distressed craft
they were able to .determine if the case needed urgent
1
attention. This Is a significant fact that had not been
previously considered. Here was a specific exaimple of
disagreement between planning and operations. Planning was done




serious, and, in fact, the operations were conducted on
the basis of a two state severity.
In terms of the analytical model, this meant that
an operational rule would be required to allow for the
servicing of serious cases on a priority basis and delaying
the non-serious cases if another resource was not available
when the request for assistance came in. If a resource
was idle it would answer immediately any case coming into
the system. The objective being to give priority service
to the cases (serious) where a delay could result in a
"disbenefit" or in this case, either death, injury, or
property damage which would lessen the net benefits and
efficiency of the system.
The model was constructed with a priority interrupt
rule for serious cases arising when resources were engaged
in processing a non-serious case. The model accounted for
the unsymmetrical weekly distribution of cases and also the
day and night distribution of cases. The model utilized
the existing SAR data files to produce, for each station,
the parameters required by the model, namely; arrival rate,
service rate, severity, and recognition factor. There was
one required input, the maximum allowable risk level in
terms of a percentage of serious cases to which response
was delayed. This risk level was initially set at 3 percent.
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The output of the model would be an hourly listing
of the ready boats that were required so as not to exceed
the 3% criteria. Also on an hourly basis the number of
delays that would probablistically be expected were shown.
The delayed cases were listed first as total cases delayed
and serious cases delayed. There were then further classified
as the number of cases delayed between specified time
intervals , i.e. X cases delayed for to 15 minutes.
The benefit of this model was that the manager
could now see how7 the number of man-hours (in the form of
ready boat crews) could be compared and equated to a risk
of delaying an assistance case.
The question now arose as to what the desired level
of response capability was to be at a particular station.
Previously, it had been erroneously accepted that every case
was receiving immediate response, now we are saying that the
level of response can be managed. This method of trade-off
analysis was presented to the Commandant and accepted at
1
the 3 percent risk level as a tentative planning tool.
The Commandant directed that this analytical
technique be brought to the attention of all district
planning officers. On May 14-16 a planning seminar was
2
held in Washington, D.C. for all field planning offices.
At the 3 percent risk level virtually no serious
cases were delayed, however the possible reductions in
manhours per week was very significant.
2
SAR Study, 2nd interim report, p. 43-
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Skeptical at first, these officers realized the need to
combat the great increase in the work week due to the
seasonal increases at shore stations. These officers returned
to their commands prepared to carry out the Commandant's
desires
.
Clearance for a full scale test was granted and
the Boston-Group, comprising five shore stations, was
selected as the test location. The te.st was conducted from
the weekend prior to Memorial Day weekend until two weeks
after Labor Day. The readiness policy, the number of ready
boat and man hours per week, was specified for each station
on the basis of the 3 percent risk criteria of the model.
The readiness policy was very closely adhered to, with the
net results of the period showing that not a single case,
serious or non-serious was delayed. More significant was
the fact that the work week in terms of man-hours at the
station had been held to between 68 and 72 hours as compared
to the previous years that approached 120 hours.
During the week of October 12th, 1968, the annual
District Commanders' Conference was held at Washington.
These field commanders had heard from their planning
officers about the analytical model "that was suppose to





"their people 1 ' for long duty hours, they listened attentively
at the rationale and basic assumptions were explained.
The theory of risk was explained and well received
realizing that the actual risk would be small but the
benefits in terms of reduced workweek would be great.
The comparison of risk to boat crew man-hours per week was
2
explained in terms of trade-off analysis shown in Figure 5.
Most shore stations were maintaining readiness
policies in the range of points 7 and 8 shown in Figure 5,
which accepting the rationale as presented, indicated that
the point of diminishing returns had been exceeded and to
add more personnel and resources would be of little or no
benefit to the SAR program. One field commander went as
far to state that if a station provides no benefits in terms
3
of lives saved, perhaps it should be closed.
The analytical model attempts to quantify the
major variables that make up the shore stition SAR activity
so as to allow management to more closely determine demand
and staff to meet the probabilistic workload rather than
consuming excess resources.
A short coming of the model is that it does not
reflect inputs from other mission areas. For these multi-




U.S. Department of Transportation, Coast Guard,
Report of Area and District Commanders Conference , 11-18






























































determined to provide the complete resource demand at a
given station. The model indicates the utilization of
each resource used which would indicate the "slack time"
available for secondary mission work such as aids to
navigation or law enforcement. In all probability a work
measurement survey, such as the Boo^e, Allen & Hamilton
work measurement survey done for the Coast Guard in 1950




Another approach would be to revise the SAR
assistance reporting system to include reports on the
utilization of all resources for all missions. This would
place all data in a machine processable format and the
analytical model could treat the utilization of resources
as a non-serious SAR incident and treat It in the queue
program. Possibly, a decision rule could be written into
the model such that all SAR would be processed before any
secondary missions were undertaken. The feasibility of
adapting the model to handle the entire mix of mission
workloads does exist with today's technology.
Look to the Future
Having designed an analytical model for the shore
unit j it was desirable to adapt this model to other
Booze, Allen & Hamilton, Surve y of Job Classification
and Work Measurement , December 1950.
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homogeneous resources of the SAR program, namely patrol
boats. This would be in keeping with the planned course of
the study. As with most analysis the press of time
prevented the full development of the process that was
envisioned at the outset.-
e development of a simulation model to more
nearly reflect the results of readiness postures of all
resources, aircraft, vessels, and shore units, was begun
in February 1970. The simulation approach was accepted
because of the difficult and complex nature of designing a
model to accommodate the aircraft 'and vessel responses to
SAR. It was estimated that to build these models would
1
require as long as five years to complete. This would not
satisfy the SAR mission manager nor would it satisfy the
Commandant
.
The simulation, designated SARSIM, was envisioned
as dealing with an entire district with upwards of 150
resources assigned. The SARSIM would give management the
facility to play "what if" games in the employment and
assignment of resources. The number, location, type, and
employment policies of resources would be variable. The
SARSIM greatly increases the flexibility of alternatives
open to the manager. The SARSIM suffers the basic failing
of the analytical model in that it treats only the SAR
SAR Study, 3rd interim report, p. 7
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workload and any other mission requirement must be "added
on" to develop the total picture. As of this writing the
SARSIM is operational and is undergoing testing and
validation. It is anticipated that it will be operational
for use by management in July 1971.
It is interesting to note that in 1962 the Roles
and Mission Study stated that:
The problem is basic : How can one
correlate the tremendous number of
variations in a manner that will permit an
orderly , and reasonably scientific
s
process
of decision-making? The variables are
almost limitless; some of the more
significant variables are: the type of
vessel or aircraft in distress } the number
of people involved, the location of the
incidents, the distance to be covered by
^
assisting vessels or aircraft, the number
and type of vessels or aircraft required,
the number and frequency of incidents future
and current, other mission requirements, and
the availability of facilities to supplement
those maintained by the Coast Guard.
^
The Roles and Mission Task Force recognized the
magnitude of the problem and suggested a possible avenue
towards solution when they further stated that: "Consideration
should be given to the use of one of the more prominent and
3
tested operations research techniques—simulation.
"
There are several distinct advantages of the SARSIM
approach to the problem.
Ensrud, Interview .
2





a. The Coast Guard's involvement in a project
of this magnitude and complexity would allow Coast Guard
personnel to become increasingly knowledgeable and
self-sustaining in the field of operations research,
thus providing a future base of planning expertise.
b. The SARSIM will require extensive use of the
SAR data base which in turn v/ill highlight the required
modifications to the SAR reporting system so as to maintain
an information flow responsive to management's dynamic
needs
.
It is generally agreed that the SAR Criteria and
Force Analysis Issue Study to date represents a significant




The development of analytical methods of analysis
has greatly increased the range of program alternatives.
Heretofore, all or nothing decisions were predominant but
now incremental changes are possible.
The shore station analytical model has made it
possible to quantify benefits associated with incremental
changes. The concept of a facility less than a shore unit
in size was developed as an outgrowth of the analytical
model. The station at Jonesport, Maine, has been reduced
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to six persons from sixteen. The station grounds and
buildings no longer exist as Coast Guard property.
Operations are conducted from rented pier space in town.
The subunit has only to be ready to proceed when called
by telephone, there are no additional duties such as
watchstanding or general maintenance. By tailoring the
response capability to meet or just exceed the demand is a
start towards suboptimizing the SAR program.
The analytical techniques have focused on the
minimization of operational expences rather than directly
looking at future capital expenses.
1
Lieutenant Commander W.B. Howland, Assistant
Chief, SAR Systems Staff, personal interview, 8 April 1971.

CHAPTER IV
APPRAISAL OF COAST GUARD PLANNING
Federal Planning Requirements
Federal p] ' ng requirements were directed by
the President on October 12, 1965, when Bureau of the
Budget Bulletin No. 66-3 was issued. This bulletin
introduced an integrated Planning, Programming, Budgeting
System in the Executive Branch of the federal government.
Previously, stress had been on the setting of
goals, defining objectives and developing planned program:
for achieving objectives. The basic concepts of the new
system were:
(1) The existence in each agency of an
analytic capability which carries out continuing
in-depth analyses by permanent specialized
staffs of the agency's objectives and its
various programs to meet these objectives.
(2) The existence of a multi-year
Planning and Programming process which
incorporates and uses an information system
to present data in meaningful categories
essential to the making of major decisions
by agency heads and by the President.
(3) The existence of a Budgeting
process which can take broad program decisions,
translate them into more refined decisions in
a budget context, and present the appropriate
program and financial data for Presidential
and Congressional action. x
U.S. Executive Office of the President, Bureau of
the Budget Bulletin No. 66-3, Planning-Programmlng-Budgeting
,




Essentials of the planning, programming, budgeting
systems are listed as:
(1) An output oriented (This term is used
interchangeably with mission-oriented or objectives-
oriented) program structure which presents data on
all of the operations and activities of the agency
in categories which reflect the agency's end
purposes or objectives.
(2) Analyses of possible alternative
objectives of the agency and of alternative
programs for meeting these objectives. Many
different techniaues of analysis will be
appropriate, but central should be the carrying
out of broad systems analyses in which alternative
programs will be compared with respect to both
their costs and their benefits.
(3) Adherence to a time, cycle within which
well-considered information and recommendations
'will be produced at the times needed for
decision-:
' ng and for the development of the
President's budget and legislative programs.
(
'! ) Acceptance by line officials with
.-.ppropriate staff support, of responsibility
for the establishment and effective use of the
system. -1
The output products of the system are a rnulti-year
program and financial plan, which is updated on a systematic
basis and analyses which includes both program memoranda
and special studies which are in-depth analyses of specific
topics. The requirements of the program and financial plan
are that:
(1) It will be structured on a group of output






(2) It will be projected for a period of years,
normally, five.
(3) It will include all contemplated as well as
present activities of the agency.
(4) It will show appropriate levels for the
entire period as determined by the agency head.
(5) It will express objectives and planned
accomplishments in quantitative non-financial terms which
were possible.
(6) It will relate the program activity to the
total universe being served.
(7) It will provide financial data associated
with physical data to show the cost of carrying out the
program.
(8) It will translate the costs into the terms
used in budget preparation.
The purpose of the analysis in the system is stated
as
An analytical effort will be undertaken to
examine deeply program objectives and criteria
of accomplishments. Wherever applicable the
effort will utilize systems analyses, operations
research, and other pertinent techniques. The
analyses should raise important questions,
compare the benefits and costs of alternative
programs and explore future needs in relationship
to p]anned programs. The sources of data used
will be many, including most importantly, the
Program and Financial Plan, special studies




and operating data. It is important to have
continuity in the work of staffs doing this
work, and to build expertise in them over a
period of years. As expertise is developed,
more and more of the agency's activities can
be subjected to these analytical techniques
.
1
The planning, programming, budgeting system thus
requires the development of a series of plans by the Coast
Guard with an orientation towards mission outputs. These
plans must be based on stated objectives in each mission
area. Assumptions and decision criteria must be specifically
listed and alternative ways of attaining the objectives
must be explored. Lastly, the dollar requirements must be
fully set out, so that benefits can be compared with costs,
and then the conversion must be made to the financial term
of the federal budget system.
This last step is critical because it is necessary
to do concrete things, such as purchase vessels, aircraft,
construct a building, or hire a person. Mission accomplishment,
however, comes only indirectly from these actions. The
Congress insists upon appropriating funds for things and
employees, and requires that budgets be so presented.
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting System is
a system that emphasizes strategic planning in the management







used in that it requires examination of the entire program
rather than just examining departure from an established
base level.
Present Coast Guard Capabilities
The PPB system has resulted in a more specific and
concrete expression of Coast Guard objectives and accomplishment;
The use of an output-oriented program structure based on
objectives has forced the Coast Guard to develop criteria
for determining the cost effectiveness and cost benefit
of programs, and to evaluate policies followed in the
conduct of specific programs. As a result, quantitative
non-financial measures of outputs and benefits have been
developed for most Coast Guard programs. As an illustration
the Coast Guard Search and Rescue- (SAR) Program will be
discussed in terms of quantified outputs, benefits;, and
effectiveness. The Coast Guard program structure is shown
in Figure 6.
Search and Rescue is a major operating activity
of the Coast Guard in terms of resources used. Search and
Rescue resources are nearly all multi-mission and include
in addition to command and control facilities, 176 shore
stations and bases with boats attached, 36 high endurance
cutters, 2k medium endurance cutters, 79 patrol craft, and
Morris D. Helton, "The Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System as a Coast Guard Management Tool."
Unpublished MBA Thesis, School of Government and Business
Administration, The George Washington University, 1970.
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114 operational air-craft. ie cost of the SAR program for
fiscal year 1970 totaled $116 million, or slightly over 20
percent of the Coast Guard budget. The trend of the SAR
program cost as a percentage of the total Coast Guard budget
is shown in Figure 7.
The objective of the Search and Rescue Program
is "to render aid to persons and property in distress on
or over the high .-• and waters subject to the jurisdiction
2
of the United St, s." The output of the Coast Guard SAR
program is measured by the number of SAR sorties, the
ibe-r of SAR responses, and the number of SAR cases
3
responded to.
1 se outputs are quantitative measures of
the end products produced by the SAR program. Such
ares are useful for internal planning and programming;
however, they do not measure the degree to which the SAR
program accomplishes its objective (effectiveness) or the
U.S. Department of Transportation, Coast Guard,
Coast Gua rd FY 1971 Program Proposal s, April 30, 1969, p. 196
2 T1 . .Ibid .
-^ SAR response represents action taken by one
Coast Guard operating facility. For example, an air station
sending ir< e planes on a SAR case would get credit for one
response; a ship proceeding on the same case would be
credited with one response; and a shore station sending one
or more 1 5 on the same case would also be credited with
one response—three responses for one SAR case responded to.
A SAR sor tie represents a single voyage, flight, or trip
made by a piece of SAR hardware. In the example above, tne
air station would count three sorties, the ship one, and the

















utility (benefit) derived from the SAR program. Benefit
measures are required for program analysis and for decisions
king regarding trade-offs between competing programs.
The program objective for SAR indicate that the
benefits should be analogus to the "rendering of aid to
persons and property in distress. .* ." The benefits of a
program that renders aid to persons and property in distress
must be measured in terms of what the program does for the
clientele. The most important function is the saving of
lives, or the prevention of death. Secondary benefits are
prevention of the loss of property, prevention of injuries
,
relief of anxiety, and so on. Unfortunately, techniques do
not exist for measuring some of these benefits in quantitative
terms. The benefit of the Coast Guard SAR program is
measured by the number of deaths prevented, the number of
injuries prevented, and the value of property saved as the
1
result of Coast Guard SAR efforts -.
Deaths prevented, injuries prevented, and property
damage prevented are considered to be valid measures of
benefits from safety programs. Many organizations that are
safety oriented use "actual deaths" as the primary program
benefit descriptor. e number of actual deaths is
important information for management to have, but it does
not indicate the total benefits. Using actual deaths as
U.S. Department of Transportation, Coast Guard,
Memorandum from Chief of Staff to Program Directors, Program
Definitions, March 12, 1969, P- SAR 5.
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the indicator of benefits would fail to reveal that no lives
were being saved by the program.
The Coast Guard SAR reporting system provides the
data necessary to determine with a fairly high degree of
accuracy, how many lives would have been lost. Data on the
actual deaths are available from three sources, the SAR
information data file, the Boating Safety file of accident
investigations, and also the Commercial Vessel Safety
Program of the Office of Merchant Marine Safety. The SAR
reporting system also provides data on injuries prevented
and the value of property saved as a result of the SAR
program, however, these benefits are difficult to measure.
The effectiveness of the Coast Guard SAR program
has been discussed in the preceeding chapter. The effectiveness
of the SAR program can be estimated; however, any finer
measurement would require an all inclusive information system
that would ensure that all deaths 'and lives saved were
properly recorded. The present system, admittedly, is not
100 percent accurate. A new system, while it might include
1
more data, would be more expensive. The present level of
effectiveness should be considered acceptable provided that
a judgmental decision, based on sound logic, can be used to
evaluate incidents where a death has occurred and
subjectively state whether the incident was within the




survive the initial incident, his death should not be
chargeable against the effectiveness of the reactive SAR
forces. Documented cases exist where persons have fallen
overboard while alongside a Coast Guard rescue unit and even
here, where search and transit time need not be considered,
a life was lost." it appears that.some threshold level
exist: ./here the number of lives lost cannot be greatly
reduced by the addition of more reactive forces.
»
The SAR pr n has a stated objective and
produces outputs that arc quantifiable. Direct benefit
measures do exist and are reported and collected. The SAR
program meets the federal government's requirements for
PPB. With three types of facilities competing for program \
fund,-, it appears that all the requisite information exists
for management to ut ' Li: a benefit-cost analysis as an aid
to decision making.
SAR Program Costs and Benefits
The use of costs and benefits as a means of
col ; 'ing bore stations has assisted in identifying the
marginal benefit, low workload stations. Justification for
the closing of five shore stations has been largely centered
an.. the costs and benefits of these individual stations.




closings based on this type analysis. Minor concessions
had to be made in a few instances to provide partial
coverage to the area for daylight hours during summer
periods of boating activity; a small proce to pay to close
a station that had been selected for closing many years
• 1
earlier.
The resource allocation problem within the SAR
program appears to lend itself to a cost-benefit type
analysis. Table 2 depicts the comparative positions of the
three resource types within the SAR program. At first
glance, Table 2 would seem to indicate that the shore units
provided the greatest portion of benefits and at a greatly
lower cost than the other resource types, and should in
aggregate be entitled to a greater share of AC&I fund for
rehabilitation and reconstruction. Undeniably, the snore
units provide the foundation for the SAR program in terms
of benefits and assistance cases responded to. The AC&I
funding within the SAR program is shown in Table 1. It is
clearly evident that the aviation facilities were being
modernized and increased at the expense of a balanced
replacement program across facilities.
Justification for the "favored" position of
aviation, in terms of AC&I expenditures, can be traced to










^ pP (D 3
CO <P P-,







































CO O • o
O P £ C
O £
u o CO
rH O ^ •H
cd -H CO
3 u op q,p c-~
O O c^
cd co c rH
u
0) cd CO M





to U C cd >JP o cd p p
CO Cm cd •H
O CO Q rH
o cd •H •H
-p CO cd o






in 1915 it has been the one resource that is truly
1
multi-mission in use. The use of aircraft in Coast
Guard work was envisioned by 2nd Lieutenant Norman B.
Hall and 3rd Lieutenant Elmer F. Stone in 1915 while
2
serving aboard the Cutter ONONDAGA. The initial use of
aircraft was considered for locating derelicts drifting
in the sealanes. Today Coast Guard aircraft span all
missions from search and rescue to oceanography and oil
pollution surveillance. By comparison the shore unit
and its small boats have expanded their basic usefulness
very little.
Aircraft in comparison to vessels and shore
stations are short-lived. The increases in the aircraft
technology has produced better and more capable aircraft
over time. As aircraft capabilities increased the capacity
to satisfy the SAR demand was exceeded with each replacement
aircraft, and it was only reasonable to expect that this
excess capacity would be applied to other missions. Today
the air deliverable, anti-pollution transfer system (ADAPTS)
of oil pollution containment is primarily dependent on
aircraft
.
An analysis of reconstruction projects for shore
units is difficult in terms of cost-benefit. What would be
the benefits of a new barracks to the SAR program? The
Robbins, Interview .
2
U.S. Treasury Department, Coast Guard, The Story of
Coast Guard Aviation
,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1964), p. 8.
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barracks could not respond to a case and therefore could
not directly be credited with saving lives, preventing
injuries or property damage. The new modernized barracks
would certainly have benefits to the Coast Guard, possibly
hard to quantify, but, nevertheless identifiable. The
benefit would be classified as social or welfare oriented.
The better living standa s would have an effect on morale,
job satisfaction and possibly even re-enlistment rate.
The real world of political pressures distorts
the priorities of programs regardless of any benefit
analysis. If the oil pollution containment project had
been deferred to an improved habitability project then
Congressional pressure would have been applied. Congressmen
become aware of oil on beaches but not necessarily poor
living and working conditions at Coast Guard stations.
Programs with political interest get the spotlight and the
funds
.
Another footer that may have influenced the past
poor funding for shore urii may be based on pressures at
the Departmental level. Having survived its infancy, the
Department now se I s to expand and has called upon all
agencies to seek Bold New I] It '•'". (BNI). Within the
SAR program a pilot evalu; Lon is underway to determine the
1
feasibility of air cushion ve3 i» I :s (ACVj for use in SAR.
1
Captain James II. MacDonald, USCG, Chief, Surface
Facilities Branch, persona] interview. May 3, 1971.
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This would be a revolutionary development in SAR surface
facilities
.
As a matter of comparison the search and rescue
organization of Great Britain is described below. The
search and rescue organization in Great Britain is comprised
of mainly shore stations. These shore stations are
organized similar to the early Life .Saving Service of
this country, having only one or two paid persons at each
station with the bulk of the personnel volunteers. The
operational statistics are very interesting. In 1970
they carried 2,592 rescue operations that resulted in the
saving of 2,675 lives. The total budget was estimated at
about $o million. By comparison the United States Coast
Guard in 1969 saved 2,051 lives at a cost of $116 million.
A major difference between the operations in Great Britain
and the United States lies in the fact that the British
respond to calls where it is known that lives are threatened.
In the United States a large percentage of cases are in
fact non-serious. In a sample of SAR cases reported by
shore units there, were 605 non-serious cases in a sample
3
of 9^2 cases checked, or 63 percent non-serious cases.
Typical non-serious cases include towing boats that have
United Kingdom, An Official Handbook
,
(London:
Her majesty's Signal Office, 1969), p. 509- CCost includes
operating expense. and AC&I).
2
Cost of the SAR program is for only operating
expenses
.
Lieutenant Junior Grade, Gordon McDonald, Staff
Programmer, SAR Systems Staff, personal interview, May 3, 1971
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run out of gas, towing boats with engine failures, towing
becalmed sail boats, etc. These activities do not produce
benefits that refer back to the program objective.
Cost-benefit analysis may assist in decision
making; however, it may also create unforeseen problems in
an effort to optimize benefits and minimize costs. The
case cited below is a case in point.
A LESSON LEARNED— A recent light -station
improvement project involved removal of the
traditional lantern stop the light tower and
the replacement of the classical lens light
apparatus with an exposed airways type
beacon. Strong and widespread public criticism
of the "decapitated" lighthouse will probably
require restoration to its original appearance
at considerable expense to the Coast Guard.
No estimate has been made of the cost of
replying to the correspondence received, but
it is not insignificant. The Commandant has
responded to 14 letters, and the District
Commander concerned has received even more
letters. Since the situation kept changing,
it was not possible to use one reply for all
inquiries .
^
Changes Needed in Pr esent Proces s
A glaring weakness of the Coast Guard, in regards
to its present planning process, is the lack of involvement
of top management. If plans are to flow upward then policy
decisions will have to slow downward in the organization.
With competition among programs throughout the government,
U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant's Bulletin 3 No
2-70, 9 January 1970, p. 3
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the very existence of an agency is threatened if poor
planning is allowed to continue.
It will be necessary to convince Congress that
balanced hardware programs will not always be practicable.
Rather a balance among missions on a priority basis should
be suggested. Attempts should be made to phase hardware
purchases in order to break the pattern of large amounts of
equipment becoming obsolete in a short period.
The first item needing to be accomplished is the
establishment of realistic program objectives and a guide
as to relative priorities of missions and specific programs.
Here top management interaction with staff level planning
is required. Also needed are general policy guidance and
information as to the Commandant's objectives and desires
so as to serve as a coordination center or focal point for
all planning efforts. A previous study called for a focal
2
point for long range planning within the Coast Guard.
If meaningful and effective planning is to be
accomplished throughout the Coast Guard , then additional
talent to provide appropriate staff elements with the
required resources must be added. A review must be made of
personnel assignment policies that rotate military personnel
on the basis of calendar time. The training required for
sophisticated planning dictates that planning specialists
3-Allen Snick, "The Road to PPB: The Stages of
Budget Reform" Public Adm ini stration Review , December ±966,
pp. 243-258.
^Alfred W. Saverbrey, Report on a Review of the
Long-Range Planning Activities of the Treasu r y Department
,
(Washington: Brookings Institution,' June, I9~b2 ) , pp . 11-13 •
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be handled differently as to type and length of assignments.
Many planning tasks require some operational experience for
adequate task accomplishment. A mix of military and
civilian personnel to comprise a planning group appears
necessary to provide a blend of continuity and expertise.
An area for consideration would be the centralizing
of planning efforts closer to top management. Considering
the rise in the use of computers and top management's need
for information, a rationale could be made for the





This study has been focused on the shore station
planning activity in the United States .Coast Guard. Presently,
the condition of the shore plant appears generally to be in
a state of decay. Past budgets have not provided funds for
adequate rehabilitation so that today a major rebuilding
program looms before us. Shore unit planning has followed
the lead of aviation since the 1930' s in the formulation of
plans. The present analytical tool, SARSIM, was a direct
outgrowth of the shore station readiness model and it appears
to have great impact on the management of SAR resource.
The material to answer the first subsidiary question
"What has been the evolution of the present techniques?"
was provided In Chapter III. The planning techniques have
evolved over the years and have resulted in the analytical
efforts that exist today. The analytical approach used
today requires the establishment of objectives, statement of
criteria and assumptions, projection of workload data,




full cost data. Additionally, it has been indicated that
more than analytical techniques are required in the
formulation of feasible plans. An assessment of the
political factors, both internal and external, must also be
made and accounted for.
As this evolution continue's, it can be forecast
that . .. ning activity will be generated from within the
service as well as being a reaction to outside demands.
The advantage of such an evolution would be gained from
being offensive and oriented toward strong program:; rather
than defensive. This growing trend v/ill be characterized by
a stronger, more demanding management that can look
objectively upon itself with a critical eye.
The second subsidiary question was "Have the past
shore station's plans been flexible in permitting attainment
of partial objectives rather than cancellation of total
plans?". In terms of the actual Shore Units Plan document,
the planned funding level was never achieved and the plan
became hopelessly out of date in two years and required
revision. In 196^ the Plan was reissued in entirity
without, however
a
a. financial plan detailing annual projected
levels of expenditure. The Plan has not been updated since
196^-1 and is considered ineffective as a planning document and
remains only a source of shore station planning criteria.
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The answer to the second, question, therefore, is in the
negative with qualification as to facility priorities.
The last two subsidiary questions will be dealt
with collectively. The Coast Guard planning system has
felt increasingly stronger pressures from outside sources.
First the change to PPB caused a great deal of internal
restructuring for the Coast Guard and all other federal
agencies. The transfer to the Department of Transportation
has caused pressure to adapt present programs to a safety-
orientation. The transfer to the Department of Transportation
also brought with it a greater input as to national
priorities as can be witnessed by the concept of the Bold
V
New Initiatives concept to planning. The advancement of
the Coast Guard's research and development efforts in the
areas of new programs and new resources attests to the fact
that national priorities are serving as inputs to present
planning.
In the general vein of improved management
techniques required for advanced planning the Coast Guard
is striving to make quantum leaps forward. In general, the
external pressures have given impetus to Coast Guard
management to maintain an adaptable framework for planning.
The development of advanced planning models indicates the





The primary question of this research paper is,
"Will the planning techniques presently used by the United
States Coast Guard be satisfactory for developing future
shore station programs?". .
The answer to this question is in the affirmative,
as the development of sound mission-oriented programs have
become a reality. The capability for qualitative analysis
permits the manager to trade-off various alternatives to
produce an optimum program in terms of cost and benefits.
It is clear that the Coast Guard has adopted
techniques that allow for planning in the dynamic environment
of the federal government. This dynamic planning which
require:; frequent interaction with top management will
have the net effect of producing a flow of very competent
managers within the Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard has utilized it" fragmented and
limited analytical capabilities to improve the management
of its largest program—Search and Rescue. The effort of
this analytical study has already borne significant fruit
in terms of revise-; workweek standard and resource management.
Valuable training of future planners has taken place while
developing an overall improved capability. It is the
conclusion of this thesis that the factors of change in
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the federal system have brought about an increased planning
capability that will be responsive to the dynamic forces
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